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Distrust:	  Not	  only	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations	  	  Sabina	  Siebert	  and	  Barbara	  Czarniawska	  
	  
Abstract	  In	   this	   article	  we	  discuss	   the	   issue	   of	   distrust	   in	   the	  most	   extreme	   example	   of	  distrustful	   organizations:	   secret	   service	   organizations.	   Distrust	  may	   be	   a	   basic	  organizing	   principle	   in	   such	   organizations,	   but	   how	   is	   it	   produced	   and	  maintained?	  Inspired	  by	  Actor–Network	  Theory,	  we	  analyzed	  the	  devices,	  codes,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  used	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  and	  then	  asked	  if	  these	  devices,	   codes,	   rules,	   and	   procedures	   differ	   from	   those	   used	   in	   ordinary	  organizations.	  	  Based	  on	  our	  analysis,	  we	  make	  two	  contributions.	  Firstly,	  we	  draw	  researchers’	  attention	  to	  distrust	  that	  is	  intentionally	  built	  and	  maintained	  rather	  than	  distrust	  that	  is	  accidental	  and	  indicative	  of	  faulty	  management.	  Secondly,	  we	  identify	  the	  material	  manifestations	  of	  distrust.	  We	  argue	  that	  in	  future	  studies	  of	  trust	   and	   distrust	   in	   organizations,	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  technologies,	  physical	  objects,	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects.	  These,	  together	  with	  discourses,	  guarantee	  the	  stability	  of	  connections	  among	  organizational	  actions.	  	  	  	  
Keywords:	   Actor–Network	   Theory,	   distrust,	   objects	   and	   quasi-­‐‑objects,	   secret	   service	  organizations,	  trust.	  	   Our	  study	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  myriads	  of	  studies	  on	  trust	  in	  organizations	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  trust	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  organizations	  (see	  e.g.,	  Luhmann,	  1979;	  Sztompka,	  1999;	  Möllering,	  2006).	  Such	  studies	  typically	  suggest	  that	  trust	  brings	  improvement	  in	  job	  satisfaction,	  job	  performance,	  and	  employee	  commitment	  (Robinson,	  1996;	  Dirks	  &	  Ferrin,	  2001);	  leads	  to	  faster	  decision-­‐‑making	  (Shapiro,	  Sheppard,	  &	  Cheraskin,	  1992;	  Fulmer	  &	  Gelfand	  (2012);	  and	  generates	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improvements	  in	  organizational	  performance	  (Barney	  &	  Hansen,	  1994).	  These	  benefits	  may	  be	  lost	  when	  trust	  in	  an	  organization	  is	  lost,	  which	  explains	  why	  literature	  on	  this	  subject	  contains	  various	  prescriptions	  on	  how	  to	  repair	  trust	  (Gillespie	  &	  Dietz,	  2009;	  De	  Cremer	  &	  Desmet,	  2012).	  Indeed,	  when	  researchers	  find	  examples	  of	  distrust	  they	  treat	  these	  as	  problems	  that	  need	  to	  be	  tackled.	  	   Yet	  there	  exist	  organizations	  in	  which	  distrust	  is	  not	  only	  allowed	  to	  stay,	  but	  is	  produced	  and	  cultivated:	  secret	  service	  organizations.	  One	  of	  the	  banner	  notices	  in	  the	  International	   Spy	   Museum	   in	   Washington	   states:	   “Trust	   No-­‐‑one,”	   and	   the	   museum	  collections	  serve	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  distrust	  is	  an	  important	  operating	  principle	  in	  the	  secret	   service,	   both	   inside	   secret	   service	   organizations	   and	   between	   secret	   service	  organizations	  and	  other	  actors.	  Indeed,	  the	  theme	  of	  distrust	  in	  espionage	  is	  a	  recurrent	  one	  in	  spy	  memoirs,	  biographies,	  novels,	  and	  films.	  The	  world	  of	  spies	  appears	  to	  be	  rife	  with	  distrust,	  but	  secret	  service	  organizations	  have	  no	  choice	  in	  the	  matter.	  Even	  trusting	  other	  agents	  can	  be	  risky,	  for	  agents	  who	  place	  too	  much	  trust	  in	  their	  colleagues	  may	  bring	   about	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   organization	   if	   these	   colleagues	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   double-­‐‑agents.	  Possible	  betrayal	  therefore	  violates	  the	  norms	  of	  trust	  (Collins,	  2015).	  	  This	  is	  why	  managers	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations	  must	  endeavor	  to	  cultivate	  distrust—distrust	  in	  their	  own	  agents	  and	  their	  agents'	  distrust	  in	  other	  actors.	  We	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  secret	  service	  organizations	  because	  they	  are	  an	  extreme	  case,	  or	  an	  ideal	  type,	  of	  distrustful	  organizations,	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  our	  conclusions	  reveal	  something	  about	  other	  types	  of	  organizations,	  which	  organizational	  studies	  scholars	  tend	  to	  miss.	  	   We	  ask	  a	  question:	  How	  do	   secret	   service	  organizations	  produce	  and	  maintain	  distrust?	  Inspired	  by	  Actor–Network	  Theory	  (ANT),	  we	  analyzed	  devices,	  codes,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  used	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  and	  then	  compared	  them	  with	  those	  used	   in	   ordinary	   organizations.	   	   Based	   on	   our	   analysis,	   we	   make	   two	   contributions.	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Firstly,	   we	   draw	   researchers’	   attention	   to	   distrust	   that	   is	   intentionally	   built	   and	  maintained	  rather	  than	  distrust	  that	  is	  accidental	  and	  indicative	  of	  faulty	  management.	  Secondly,	  we	  identify	  and	  discuss	  the	  material	  manifestations	  of	  distrust	  –	  technologies,	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	  used	  by	  organizations	  to	  watch,	  listen,	  record,	  and	  manipulate	  actors	   both	   their	   employees	   and	   other	   actors.	  We	   believe	   that	   scholars	   studying	   the	  production	   and	   maintenance	   of	   distrust	   in	   organizations,	   will	   need	   to	   focus	   on	  technologies,	   physical	   objects,	   and	   quasi-­‐‑objects.	   These,	   together	   with	   discourses,	  guarantee	  the	  stability	  of	  connections	  among	  organizational	  actions.	  	  	  	   We	   begin	   by	   explaining	   what	   we	   mean	   by	   secret	   service	   organizations	   and	  continue	  with	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  understanding	  trust	  and	  distrust.	  After	  discussing	  the	  ANT	  approach	  chosen	  and	  the	  methods	  used,	  we	  present	  our	  analysis	  and	  conclusions.	  Before	  going	  any	  further,	  two	  caveats	  should	  be	  made.	  Acknowledging	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  an	  ordinary	  organization,	  we	  use	  this	  term	  to	  mean	  organizations	  other	  than	  secret	  service	  organizations.	  Similarly,	  we	  use	  the	  word	  spy,	  which	  is	  a	  label	  from	  popular	  culture	  used	  to	  denote	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  roles	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations.	  Whereas,	   in	   practice	   such	   organizations’	   employees	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   agents,	   secret	  agents,	  undercover	  agents,	  intelligence	  officers,	  intel	  analysts,	  and	  many	  other	  terms.	  	  
Secret	  service	  organizations	  Secret	   service	   organizations,	   also	   known	   as	   espionage	   organizations	   or	  intelligence	  agencies,	  engage	  in	  collecting,	  analyzing,	  and	  exploiting	  information	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  countries	  from	  security	  breaches	  that	  may	  cause	  economic	  or	  political	  harm.	   Contemporary	   examples	   include	   the	   Swedish	   Security	   Service	   (Säpo),	   the	   UK’s	  Secret	   Security	   Service	   (MI6),	   the	   US	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	   (CIA),	   and	   Russia’s	  Federal	  Security	  Service	  (FSB).	  Some	  famous	  secret	  service	  organizations	  from	  the	  past	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are	   the	   KGB	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   (1954–1991)	   and	   the	   State	   Security	   Service	   in	   East	  Germany	   (Stasi,	   1950–1990).	   People	   working	   in	   operational	   roles	   in	   secret	   service	  organizations	   are	   usually	   referred	   to	   as	   spies,	   secret	   agents,	   undercover	   officers,	   or	  intelligence	  officers.	  People	  who	  are	  asked	  why	  they	  became	  spies	  have	  been	  quoted	  as	  providing	  various	  motives:	  love	  of	  their	  country,	  ideological	  persuasion,	  profit	  seeking,	  satisfaction	   gained	   from	   deceiving	   others,	   a	   sense	   of	   adventure,	   or	   the	   seduction	   of	  danger.	   Some,	   but	   not	   all,	   of	   these	  motives	   can	   be	   shared	   by	   people	   joining	   ordinary	  organizations.	   There	   are	   also	   many	   dramatic	   negative	   consequences	   of	   being	   a	   spy:	  discovery,	   humiliation,	   deportation,	   torture,	   and	   even	   death.	   Of	   these	   possible	  consequences,	  only	  humiliation	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  most	  other	  organizations;	  indeed,	  it	  is	  a	  relatively	  common	  occurrence	  (Czarniawska,	  2008).	  	  	   There	  have	  been	  some	  notable	  attempts	  to	  study	  secret	  organizations	  (in	  the	  past,	  Simmel,	  1906;	  and	  at	  present	  e.g.,	  Stohl	  &	  Stohl,	  2011;	  Grey,	  2012;	  Parker,	  2018),	  yet	  field	  studies	  of	  the	  secret	  service	  are	  rare	  because,	  unsurprisingly,	  their	  operations	  are	  secret.	  In	  many	  legal	  frameworks,	  it	  is	  against	  the	  law	  even	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  something	  is	  secret.	  If	   investigations	  of	  practices	  are	  allowed,	  they	  are	  often	  confined	  to	  a	  historical	  perspective,	   such	   as	   organizational	   analysis	   of	   declassified	   material.	   One	   such	   study,	  based	  on	  already	  declassified	  material,	   is	  Chris	  Grey’s	  work	  on	  Bletchley	  Park	  (2012).	  This	  was	  an	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  decoding—in	  complete	  secrecy.	  Grey	  described	  in	  great	   detail	   such	   processes	   as	   interception	   of	   signals,	   transmission	   and	  decryption	   of	  intercepts,	   intelligence	   assessment,	   secure	   distribution	   of	   information,	   and	  organizational	   arrangements	   that	   supported	   these	   processes.	   He	   explained	   how	   staff	  were	  recruited	  and	  trained,	  and	  presented	  various	  distinctions	  between	  organizational	  actors	  in	  Bletchley	  Park,	  such	  as	  gender,	  hierarchy,	  or	  social	  and	  educational	  background.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  secrecy,	  Grey	  highlighted	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  need	  to	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know	  principle—How	   is	   it	   known	   that	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   know?	   	  He	   returned	   to	   this	  question	  in	  his	  later	  book	  with	  Jana	  Costas	  (2016),	  this	  time	  focusing	  on	  two	  interrelated	  processes—ignorance	  and	  silence.	  	  These	  two	  processes,	  in	  the	  authors’	  view,	  produced	  internal	  boundaries	  between	  individuals	  and	  teams.	  Such	  boundaries	  created	  a	  complete	  isolation	  of	  employees,	  who	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  discuss	  any	  aspects	  of	  their	  work	  with	  anyone	   from	   outside	   their	   own	   "compartment."	   Although	   Grey	   and	   Costas	   did	   not	  explicitly	  discuss	  distrust,	  it	  is	  implicit	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  secrecy.	  	  Erving	  Goffman	   in	   the	   introduction	  to	  his	  Strategic	   Interactions	   (1969)	  claimed	  that	  at	  the	  very	  root	  of	  distrust	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations	  lie	  interpersonal	  relations	  between	  spies.	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  these	  “strategic	   interactions”	  develop,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   consider	   “the	   individual’s	   capacity	   to	   acquire,	   reveal,	   and	   conceal	  information,”	  claimed	  Goffman	  (1969,	  p.	  4).	  	  His	  material	  on	  intelligence	  and	  espionage	  listed	  a	  number	  of	  "basic	  moves"	  used	  in	  interactions	  concerning	  strategic	  information,	  in	  which	  “expression	  games”	   take	  place.	   	  Goffman’s	   list	   is	  obviously	  speculative,	  as	  an	  observer	   can	   never	   actually	   determine	   the	   character	   of	   the	   moves	   or	   the	   intentions	  behind	  them,	  but	  it	  is	  interesting	  nevertheless.	  What	  can	  be	  observed	  are	  the	  tools	  the	  spies	  are	  using	  in	  their	  interactions,	  and	  in	  this	  article	  we	  attempt	  a	  classification	  of	  what	  we	  called	  devices	  of	  distrust.	  Before	  we	  move	  on	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  these	  devices,	  we	  briefly	  review	  the	  literature	  on	  trust	  and	  distrust	  in	  an	  organizational	  context.	  	  
Trust	  and	  distrust	  in	  organizations	  Trust	  is	  a	  well-­‐‑researched	  concept	  and	  over	  the	  past	  years	  it	  has	  attracted	  a	  number	  of	  influential	   reviews	  (see	  e.g.,	  Dirks	  &	  Ferrin,	  2001;	  Dietz	  &	  Den	  Hartog,	  2006;	  Lewicki,	  Tomlinson	  &	  Gillespie,	  2006;	  Schoorman,	  Mayer	  &	  Davis,	  2007;	  Dirks,	  Lewicki,	  &	  Zaheer,	  2009;	  Kramer	  &	  Lewicki,	  2010;	  and	  Fulmer	  &	  Gelfand,	  2012).	  Although	  most	  of	   these	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texts	  have	  been	  written	  from	  a	  psychological	  perspective,	  there	  have	  been	  some	  notable	  sociological	   contributions	   to	   the	   study	   of	   trust	   (Luhmann,	   1979;	   Sztompka,	   1999;	  Bachmann,	  2001;	  Möllering,	  2001,	  2006).	  	  The	  definitions	  of	   trust	  cited	  most	   in	  organization	  studies	  often	  come	   from	  the	  work	  of	  Mayer,	  Davis,	  and	  Schoorman	  (1995)	  and	  Rousseau,	  Sitkin,	  Burt,	  and	  Camerer	  (1998).	  These	  definitions	  differ,	  but	  they	  have	  in	  common	  three	  themes:	  firstly,	  confident,	  positive	   expectations	   about	   the	   intentions,	   motives,	   or	   behavior	   of	   others	   (Lewis	   &	  Weigert,	   1985;	   Rousseau,	   Sitkin,	   Burt	   &	   Camerer,	   1998);	   secondly,	   willingness	   to	   be	  vulnerable	  (Mayer,	  Davis	  &	  Schoorman	  1995;	  Fryxell,	  Dooley	  &	  Vryza	  2002);	  and	  thirdly,	  expectation	  of	  reciprocity	  (Dirks	  &	  Ferrin,	  2002).	  One	  limitation	  of	  these	  definitions	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  clarity	  as	  to	  who	  is	  the	  trustee,	  and	  who	  is	  the	  trustor,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  who	   trusts	   whom.	   Commenting	   on	   this	   lack	   of	   clarity,	   Lewicki	   and	   Bunker	   (1995)	  wondered	  whether	  or	  not	  trust	  in	  individuals	  is	  the	  same	  construct	  as	  trust	  in	  organized	  systems.	   Because	   the	   word	   trust	   is	   used	   by	   researchers	   to	   discuss	   a	   variety	   of	  relationships	  in	  analyses	  conducted	  at	  interpersonal,	  organizational,	  and	  societal	  levels,	  one	  could	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  same	  across	  all	  levels.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  obvious	  that	  differences	  in	  who	  trusts	  whom	  (i.e.	  who/what	  are	  the	  referents	  of	  trust)	   can	   suggest	   different	   types	   of	   trust	   relationships	   (Börjeson,	   2017;	   Fulmer	   &	  Gelfand,	  2012;	  Zaheer	  and	  Harris,	  2005).	  Distrust	  is	  defined	  by	  philosophers	  as	  “lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  other,	  a	  concern	  that	  he	  or	  she	  may	  act	  so	  as	  to	  harm	  us,	  that	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  care	  about	  our	  welfare,	  intends	  to	  act	  harmfully,	  will	  not	  abide	  by	  basic	  moral	  norms,	  or	  is	  hostile	  towards	  us”	  (Govier,	   1997,	   p.	   34).	   There	   is	   less	   agreement	   among	   researchers	   on	   how	   distrust	   is	  related	  to	  trust.	  The	  recent	   literature	  on	  distrust	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	  question—Are	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trust	  and	  distrust	  symmetrical	  concepts	  i.e.,	  are	  they	  opposites	  of	  each	  other,	  or	  can	  they	  occur	  simultaneously?	  	  Lumineau	   (2017)	   identified	   the	   two	   main,	   yet	   contradictory,	   approaches	   to	  conceptualizing	  distrust	  in	  organization	  studies’	  literature.	  The	  first	  approach	  assumes	  that	   trust	   and	   distrust	   are	   one-­‐‑dimensional	   and	   at	   opposite	   ends	   of	   the	   same	  continuum—that	  they	  are	  mutually	  exclusive	  (e.g.,	  Deutsch,	  1958;	  Hosmer,	  1995;	  Lewicki	  &	   Bunker,	   1996;	   Schoorman,	   et.al.,	   2007).	   	   In	   this	   conceptualization,	   "low	   trust"	   is	  perceived	   as	   equivalent	   to	   “high	   distrust,”	   and	   high	   trust	   equivalent	   to	   low	   distrust	  (Bigley	  &	  Pearce,	  1998).	  Saunders	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  an	  “either/or”	  relationship.	  	  The	  second	  approach,	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  bi-­‐‑dimensional	  model,	  assumes	  that	  trust	  and	  distrust	  are	  conceptually	  distinct	  constructs,	  which	  exist	  on	  two	  separate	  continua,	  and	  can	   increase	  and	  decrease	   independent	  of	   each	  other	   (Luhmann,	  1979;	  Lewicki	   et	   al.,	  1998).	  In	  other	  words,	  trust	  and	  distrust	  can	  co-­‐‑exist	  in	  the	  same	  relationship	  (McKnight	  and	   Chervany,	   2001;	   Saunders,	   et	   al.	   2014).	   Lewicki	   et	   al.	   (1998)	   explained	   this	  relationship	  as	  follows:	  “just	  as	  it	  is	  possible...	  to	  like	  and	  dislike,	  and	  to	  love	  and	  hate,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  trust	  and	  distrust	  others”	  (1998:	  449).	  Moreover,	  Lewicki	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  argued	   that	   the	   either/or	   view	   does	   not	   capture	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   employment	  relationship,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  experience	  one	  of	  four	  relationship	  conditions:	   low	  trust/low	  distrust,	  high	  trust/low	  distrust,	   low	  trust/low	  distrust,	  and	  high	  trust/low	  distrust.	  Saunders	  et	  al.	  (2014),	  in	  their	  mixed-­‐‑methods	  study,	  found	  that	  trust	  and	  distrust	  judgments	  rarely	  occur	  simultaneously	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  single	  trustee	  subject,	  and	  that	  absence	  of	  trust	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  distrust.	  They	  concluded	  that	  when	  employees	  are	  distrustful	  and	  managers	  wish	  to	  reduce	  this	  distrust,	  they	  need	  different	  interventions	  from	  those	  used	  to	  build	  and	  maintain	  trust.	  	  The	  complex	  relationship	  between	  trust	  and	  distrust	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  Niklas	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Luhmann:	  ...	  trust	  depends	  on	  the	  inclination	  toward	  risk	  being	  kept	  under	  control	  and	  on	  the	  quota	  of	  disappointments	  not	  becoming	  too	  large.	  If	  this	  is	  correct,	  then	  one	  could	  suppose	  that	  a	  system	  of	  higher	  complexity,	  which	  needs	  more	  trust,	  also	  needs	  at	  the	  same	  time	  more	  distrust,	  and	  therefore	  must	  institutionalize	  distrust,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  form	  of	  supervision.	  (Luhmann,	  1979:	  89)	  	  We	  acknowledge	  the	  complexity	  of	   the	  conceptualizations	  of	   trust	  and	  distrust,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  bi-­‐‑dimensional	  perspective	  on	  trust	  and	  distrust,	  we	  believe	  that	  in	  secret	   service	   organizations	   trust	   and	   distrust	   co-­‐‑exist	   and	   are	   both	   crucial	   to	   the	  functioning	  of	  such	  organizations.	  	  If	  spies	  were	  not	  able	  to	  gain	  the	  trust	  of	  others	  (e.g.,	  their	   informants),	   they	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   do	   their	   job.	   Also,	   to	   do	   their	   job,	   they	  sometimes	   have	   to	   trust	   their	   agents.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   spies	   are	   taught	   to	  distrust	  as	  trusting	  too	  much	  places	  them	  in	  danger.	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  specifically	  focused	  on	  distrust,	  and	  we	  chose	  to	  work	  with	  the	  concept	   of	   distrust	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   both	   interpersonal	   relations	   and	  organizational	  systems	  (Grey	  &	  Garsten,	  2001).	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  exploring	  a	  range	  of	   distrust	   relationships:	   (1)	   distrust	   between	   spies,	   (2)	   distrust	   between	   spies	   and	  ordinary	  people,	  (3)	  spies’	  distrust	  of	  their	  bosses,	  and	  (4)	  bosses’	  distrust	  of	  their	  agents.	  	  
Actor–Network	  perspective	  on	  distrust	  How	   do	   secret	   service	   organizations	   produce	   and	   maintain	   distrust?	   Attempting	   to	  answer	  this	  question,	  we	  took	  inspiration	  from	  scholars	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  (e.g.,	  Latour,	   1992),	  who	   reminded	   organization	   scholars	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   objects	   and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	   in	   the	   production	   and	   maintenance	   of	   social	   connections.	   In	   order	   to	  incorporate	  these	  important	  insights,	  we	  applied	  Actor–Network	  Theory	  (ANT,	  which,	  in	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spite	  of	  its	  name,	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  but	  an	  approach	  to	  studying	  collective	  action,	  Latour,	  2012).	  The	  ANT	   approach	   does	   not	   suggest	   turning	   away	   from	   studying	   discourses—after	  all,	  its	  main	  inspiration	  has	  been	  the	  work	  of	  the	  semiotician	  Algirdas	  Julien	  Greimas	  (see	  e.g.,	  Greimas,	  1990;	  Latour,	  1992).	  Instead	  it	  suggests	  that	  words	  and	  things,	  humans	  and	  nonhumans	  must	  be	  studied	  together,	  and	  with	  equal	  attention.	  Thus,	  John	  Law	  and	  Annemarie	  Mol	  (1995)	  spoke	  of	  "semiotics	  of	  materiality,"	  and	  the	  Montreal	  School	  of	  Communication	   showed	   convincingly	   that	   things	   speak,	   and	   texts	   do	   things	   (see	   e.g.,	  Cooren,	  2009;	  Robichaud,	  &	  Cooren,	  2013).	  Utterances	  make	  a	  difference	   (see	  Austin,	  1962/1975),	  but	  turned	  into	  texts	  become	  quasi-­‐‑objects,	  and	  their	  impact	  is	  stronger	  and	  much	   longer	   (Ricoeur,	   1981).	   In	   organizations,	  words	   are	   used	   to	   control	   people	   and	  things,	   but	   things	   are	   also	   used	   to	   control	  words	   and	   people	   (Czarniawska-­‐‑Joerges	  &	  Joerges,	  1988).	  Thus	   inspired,	   we	   began	   by	   analyzing	   devices,	   codes,	   rules,	   and	   procedures	  employed	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations	  for	  control	  purposes.	  Having	  analyzed	  them,	  we	  asked	  the	  next	  question:	  Do	  these	  devices,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  differ	  from	  those	  used	  in	  ordinary	  organizations?	  After	  all,	  Kramer	  had	  already	  noted	  in	  1999	  that	  distrust	  and	  suspicion	  are	  common,	   recurring	  problems	   in	  many	  organizations.	  So	  why	   is	   there	  so	  much	  attention	  accorded	  to	  trust	  and	  so	  little	  to	  distrust?	  	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   could	   be	   the	   well-­‐‑entrenched	   tradition	   of	   conducting	  asymmetrical	  studies	  (more	  on	  that	  topic	  in	  Latour,	  1987).	  Management	  and	  organization	  studies	  have	  long	  been	  either	  eulogical	  (based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  distrust	  is	  proof	  of	  broken	   trust	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   immediately	   repaired,	   see	   e.g.,	   Gillespie	  &	  Dietz,	   2009;	  Bachmann,	  et	  al.,	  2015)	  or	  critical	  (based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  distrust	  is	  inherent	  in	  contemporary	   employment	   relationships	   and	   that	  nothing	   can	  be	  done	   about	   it).	  One	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example	  of	  the	  inherent	  distrust	  model	  was	  provided	  by	  Alan	  Fox	  (1974),	  who	  argued	  that	  employment	  is	  an	  entirely	  unequal	  relationship,	  characterized	  by	  domination,	  and	  that	  it	  exists	  solely	  to	  satisfy	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  dominant	  party:	  the	  employer.	  	  	   Only	  recently	  have	  symmetrical	  studies	  become	  more	  common,	  and	  organization	  scholars	  have	  started	  to	  examine	  the	  concept	  of	  distrust	  in	  greater	  detail	  (see	  e.g.,	  Tanghe	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Lumineau,	  2017;	  Saunders	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Like	  us,	  some	  of	  these	  scholars	  see	  value	  in	  examining	  distrust	  not	  solely	  in	  relation	  to	  trust,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  concept	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (Hardin,	  2004).	  Also,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  loose	  coupling	  between	  the	  two	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  Lumineau	  (2017),	  who	  noted	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  trust	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  high	  level	  of	  distrust	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Yet,	  despite	  this	  increasing	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  studying	  distrust,	  many	  issues	  surrounding	  distrust	  remain	  under-­‐‑explored,	  such	  as,	  the	  possibility—shocking	  as	  it	  may	  seem—that	  distrust	  may	  be	  not	  only	  a	  “destructive	  force”	  (Bijlsma-­‐‑Frankema	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  1018)	  but	  also	  straightforwardly	  constructive.	  	  	   Building	   on	   the	   earlier	   attempts	   to	   study	   secret	   organizations	   (Simmel,	   1906;	  Stohl	  and	  Stohl,	  2011;	  Grey,	  2012;	  Parker,	  2016)	  and	  conceptualizations	  of	  secrecy	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  non-­‐‑secret	  organizations	  (Costas	  &	  Grey,	  2013;	  2016),	  we	  focused	  on	  an	   in-­‐‑between	  situation:	  organizations	  that	  are	  not	  secret	  but	  the	  affiliation	  of	  certain	  people	  is	  enshrined	  in	  secrecy.	  	  Following	  the	  growing	  tradition	  for	  applying	  the	  ANT	  approach	  to	  organization	  studies	  (see	  e.g.,	  Czarniawska	  &	  Hernes,	  2005;	  Belliger	  &	  Krieger,	  2016),	  we	   analyze	   devices	   and	   quasi-­‐‑objects	   used	   by	   organizations	   to	   create	   and	   maintain	  distrust	  and	  secrecy.	  	  	  
Research	  design	  Our	  focus	  on	  devices	  of	  distrust	  led	  to	  us	  adopting	  the	  unusual	  approach	  of	  visiting	  three	  museums	  of	  secret-­‐‑service	  organizations:	  German	  Spy	  Museum	  in	  Berlin,	  International	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Spy	   Museum	   in	   Washington,	   and	   National	   Cryptologic	   Museum	   in	   Annapolis.	   	   The	  museum	  collections	  are	  open	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  two	  of	  the	  museums	  have	  commercial	  intent	   and	   charge	   an	   entrance	   fee,	  while	   the	   one	   located	   inside	   the	  National	   Security	  Agency	   is	   free.	   In	   contrast	   to	   corporate	   museums,	   which	   are	   exhibit-­‐‑based	   facilities	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  a	  company	  (e.g.	  Stigliani	  &	  Ravasi,	  2007),	  these	  three	  museums	  collect	  and	  display	  objects	  from	  the	  archives	  that	  illustrate	  the	  history	  of	  various	  security	  agencies	  and	  their	  operations.	  These	  collections	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  which	   the	  museums	   are	   located	   as	   they	   include	   artifacts	   used	   in	   a	   number	   of	   secret	  service	  organizations:	  KGB,	  MI5,	  MI6,	  and	  Stasi.	  The	  artifacts	  are	  of	  historical	  value,	  and	  range	  from	  the	  19th	  century	  US	  cipher	  machines	  to	  devices	  used	  by	  the	  Stasi	  in	  the	  1980s.	  For	  obvious	  reasons,	  an	  analysis	  of	  devices	  currently	  used	  by	  spies	  would	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  perform.	  Also,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  these	  are	  the	  only	  spy	  museums	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  two	  spy	  museums	  house	  thousands	  of	  artifacts	  that	  capture	  the	  most	  dramatic	  moments	   in	   the	   history	   of	   secret	   service	   organizations	   and	   the	   spy	  profession.	   These	  collections	  contain	  devices	  developed	  and	  used	  by	  spies,	  as	  well	  as	  descriptions	  of	  the	  techniques	  they	  employed	  and	  places	  they	  worked.	  At	  the	  National	  Cryptologic	  Museum	  the	   collections	   capture	   the	   legacy	   of	   the	   cryptologic	   profession.	   All	   three	   of	   these	  museums	   display	   artifacts	   that	   illuminate	   the	   work	   of	   famous	   spies	   and	   their	  achievements,	   illustrate	   the	  milestones	   in	  secret	  service	  operations,	  document	   famous	  espionage	  actions,	  and	  reveal	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  used	  in	  the	  most	  secretive	  missions	  in	  world	  history.	  In	  contrast	  to	  corporate	  museums,	  the	  three	  museums	  are	  less	  focused	  on	  the	  employees	  of	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  but	  appear	  to	  be	  designed	  for	  the	  lay	  visitor.	  The	  exhibits’	  descriptions	  are	  written	   in	  accessible	   language	  with	  no	   technical	  jargon,	   and	   do	   not	   assume	   any	   understanding	   of	   the	   historical	   contexts	   in	  which	   the	  objects	  were	  used.	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   In	   all	   three	  museums,	   visitors	   are	   told	   that	   the	   collections	  were	   prepared	   and	  maintained	  with	  the	  advice	  and	  assistance	  of	  experts	  in	  the	  intelligence	  community.	  All	  three	  places	  are	  advertised	  as	  educational	  facilities,	  allowing	  people	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  history	   of	   espionage	   and	   its	   role	   in	   influencing	   political	   decisions.	   The	   text	   on	   the	  International	   Spy	   Museum's	   website	   states	   that	   the	   museum	   is	   “committed	   to	   the	  apolitical	   presentation	   of	   the	   history	   of	   espionage	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   visitors	   with	  nonbiased,	  accurate	  information.”	  The	  National	  Cryptologic	  Museum	  website	  claims	  to	  promote	   “the	   possibility	   of	   exciting	   jobs	   in	   an	   area	   they	   [the	   visitors]	   may	   not	   have	  thought	  possible.”	  	  	   Because	   all	   three	  museums	   are	   open	   to	   the	   public,	   no	   special	   permission	  was	  sought	  for	  access.	  All	  three	  museums	  either	  gave	  us	  permission	  to	  photograph	  exhibits	  or	  allowed	  us	  to	  use	  their	  own	  stock	  photographs	  in	  publications.	  Repeated	  visits	  were	  made	  to	  the	  museums	  to	  photograph	  most	  of	  the	  artifacts	  and	  study	  their	  descriptions,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  their	  functions	  and	  the	  circumstances	  for	  which	  they	  were	  designed.	  	   The	  analysis	  followed	  the	  usual	  abductive	  pattern,	  going	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  field	  material	  and	  relevant	  theoretical	  insights	  (see	  e.g.,	  Eco,	  1990).	  The	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis	  involved	  identifying	  the	  function	  of	  the	  artifacts	  on	  display.	  In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  our	  orientation	  within	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  enormous	  collections,	  we	  classified	  the	  objects	  into	  categories	  guided	  by	  the	  question—What	  were	  the	  objects	  used	  for?	  Based	  on	  the	  emerging	  functions,	  we	  classified	  the	  objects	  into	  categories	  that	  we	  reviewed	  by	  focusing	  on	   the	   question—How	   do	   they	   relate	   to	   maintaining	   distrust	   in	   secret	   service	  organizations?	  For	  example,	  we	  asked	  the	  following	  questions:	  what	  the	  use	  of	  a	  certain	  object	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  people?	  Does	  the	  use	  of	  these	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	   suggest	  a	   conscious	  choice	   to	  distrust?	  Not	  all	   artefacts	   in	   the	  museums	  related	  to	  distrust	  (for	  example	  modes	  of	   transport	  used	  by	  spies,	  or	  cards	  containing	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stories	   of	   historical	   spy	   operations),	   and	   we	   excluded	   these	   from	   the	   analysis.	   The	  artefacts	  which	   related	   to	   distrust	  we	   classified	   the	   objects	   into	   types	   of	   devices,	   for	  example	   concealment	   devices,	   recording	   devices,	   concealed	   photography	   devices,	   or	  break-­‐‑in	  devices.	  The	  full	  classification	  of	  the	  devices	  of	  distrust	  is	  included	  in	  Table	  1.	  The	  results	  of	  our	  analysis	  i.e.,	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  devices	  and	  their	  functions,	  were	  later	  verified	  in	  a	  discussion	  with	  an	  ex-­‐‑employee	  of	  a	  secret	  service	  organization.	  The	  purpose	   of	   this	   discussion	   was	   to	   verify	   our	   understanding	   of	   these	   artifacts,	   and	  corroborate	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  classification.	  We	  were	  also	  able	  to	  identify	  a	  number	  of	  quasi-­‐‑objects,	  such	  as	  codes,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  used	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  presented	  by	  the	  museums	  in	  the	  form	  of	   textual	   descriptions	   accompanying	   the	   artifacts	   and	   recorded	   voice	   memos.	   For	  example,	  pressing	  a	  button	  next	  to	  an	  exhibit	  activated	  a	  pre-­‐‑recorded	  voice	  explaining	  the	  object’s	  function.	  Sometimes	  it	  was	  the	  voice	  of	  an	  unknown	  narrator,	  other	  times	  it	  was	  a	  famous	  person	  from	  the	  world	  of	  espionage.	  	   One—inevitable—limitation	   of	   our	   approach	   is	   that	   the	   devices	   displayed	   and	  listed	  here	  are	  part	  of	  historical	  collections,	  and	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  outdated.	  However,	  the	  technological	  details	  were	  not	  of	  concern	  for	  this	  project,	  and	  instead	  we	  focused	  on	  their	  rationale	  and	  the	  functions	  that	  they	  performed.	  Arguably,	  these	  functions	  have	  not	  changed	  over	  time.	  Contemporary	  spies	  no	  doubt	  use	  new	  devices	  and	  appropriate	  new	  technologies	   relevant	   to	   emerging	   threats.	   The	   museums	   were	   not	   displaying	   these	  devices,	  but	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  new	  technologies:	  With	  advancement	  in	  technology,	  secure	  telephony	  became	  portable,	  first	  fitting	  in	  a	  briefcase,	   and	   finally	   in	  a	  pocket.	  The	  cryptographic	  methods	   improved	  as	  well.	  Today,	  mathematical	  algorithms	  encrypt	  phone	  calls	  made	  by	  the	  President	  and	  other	  government	  leaders.	  (Text	  accompanying	  a	  picture	  of	  G.	  W.	  Bush	  making	  a	  phone	  call,	  National	  Cryptologic	  Museum).	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   Because	   ordinary	   organizations	   are	   far	   more	   researched	   than	   secret	   service	  organizations,	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  our	  analysis,	  we	  drew	  from	  existing	  academic	  and	  popular	  literature	  on	  contemporary	  organizations.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  this	  information,	  we	  attempted	  to	  pair	  secret	  organizations’	  devices	  of	  distrust	  with	  those	  in	  use	  in	  ordinary	  organizations.	  The	  match	  is	  not	  complete,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  promising	  start.	  	  	  
Devices	  in	  use	  in	  secret	  organizations	  Among	   the	  most-­‐‑used	  artifacts	  were	  recording	  devices,	  which	  had	  different	   forms	   that	  changed	   over	   time	   and	   with	   technological	   advances.	   Bugging	   devices	   and	   secret	  recording	  devices	  were	  typical	  between	  1960	  and	  1980,	  and	  changed	  into	  various	  forms	  of	   electronic	   surveillance	   in	   the	   digital	   era.	   These	   original	   devices	   were	   hidden	   in	   a	  multitude	  of	  objects:	  watches,	  match	  boxes,	  cigarette	  lighters,	  briefcases,	  umbrellas,	  and	  even	  bras	   (Photos	  1,	   	   2	   and	  3).	  Although	   they	   served	  as	   an	  obvious	  device	   for	   saving	  information,	  they	  were	  also	  used	  for	  blackmail	  and	  in	  other	  situations	  in	  which	  trust	  is	  betrayed—either	  by	  the	  people	  recorded	  or	  by	  those	  who	  recorded	  them	  without	  their	  knowledge.	  	  	  
Place	  photos	  1,	  	  2	  and	  3	  about	  here	  	   The	  museum	  collections	  house	  a	  range	  of	  objects	  used	  to	  break	  into	  and	  break	  out	  of	   places—pins	   for	   unlocking	   doors,	  wrenches,	   devices	   to	   disable	   alarm	   systems,	   and	  instruments	  that	  detect	  the	  vibrations	  of	  an	  intruder’s	  footsteps	  and	  send	  signals	  to	  an	  earpiece.	  Spies	  were	  also	  known	  to	  use	  various	  ways	  of	  hiding	  themselves—in	  concealed	  compartments	  in	  cars	  and	  rooms,	  and	  using	  thermal	  blankets	  to	  mask	  their	  body	  heat	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and	  avoid	  detection.	  	   The	   extreme	   end	  of	   the	   tools	   of	   the	   trade	   is	   reserved	   for	   a	   variety	   of	  weapons	  imaginatively	   hidden	   in	   everyday	   objects—pistols	   designed	   to	   fire	   at	   close	   range	   and	  concealed	  in	  lipsticks,	  cigarette	  lighters,	  or	  pipes;	  small	  blades	  hidden	  behind	  lapels,	  to	  allow	  hand-­‐‑to-­‐‑hand	  defense	  in	  emergencies;	  and	  a	  range	  of	  booby-­‐‑trap	  explosive	  devices.	  Pride	  of	  place	   in	  both	   the	  Washington	  and	  Berlin	  museums	   is	   reserved	   for	  umbrellas	  containing	  poison	  gas	  pellets	  that	  leave	  no	  trace	  of	  their	  deadly	  presence	  on	  the	  human	  body	  (Photo	  4).	  	  	  
Place	  photo	  4	  about	  here	  	  
Lie	  detectors	  were	  designed	  and	  are	  used	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  distrust	  in	  mind.	  They	  are	  supposed	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  person	  is	  telling	  the	  truth,	  by	  testing	  for	  physiological	  changes	  normally	  associated	  with	  lying.	  More	  extreme	  methods	  than	  a	   lie	  detector	  for	  extracting	  secrets	  from	  agents	  exist	  of	  course,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  torture.	  To	  counteract	  the	  threat	  of	  torture,	  and	  thus	  escape	  the	  risk	  of	  revealing	  valuable	  information	  to	  the	  enemy,	  
suicide	  pills	  were	  invented.	  They	  came	  in	  two	  forms:	  real	  suicide	  pills	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  take	  if	  captured	  by	  the	  enemy,	  and	  placebo	  suicide	  pills	  used	  to	  test	  the	  loyalty	  of	  an	  agent	  in	  situations	   fabricated	  by	  the	  agencies.	  The	   loyal	  agent	   is	  expected	  to	  commit	  suicide	  rather	  than	  disclose	  information	  or	  undergo	  torture.	  The	  necessity	  of	  both	  types	  of	  pills	  was	  based	  on	  distrust—the	  agency’s	  distrust	  of	  the	  agent’s	  ability	  to	  withstand	  torture	  and	  to	  choose	  an	  easy	  death	  over	  the	  risk	  of	  torture.	  	  	   The	   list	  of	  objects	  used	   to	  disguise	   a	   spy	   is	   a	   long	  one:	   clothes	   that	   create	   fake	  identities,	   false	  beards,	   and	  wigs	  being	   the	  most	   obvious.	  A	  1944	  US	   spy	   government	  manual	  advised	  “Never	  use	  a	  disguise	  except	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  –	  but	  when	  you	  do,	  play	  it	  for	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what	  it’s	  worth.”	  Disguises,	  however,	  are	  not	  expressions	  of	  distrust	  of	  the	  secret	  service	  towards	   their	   employees;	   they	   are	   expressions	   of	   distrust	   towards	   other	   people	   and	  other	  organizations.	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   prominent	   quasi-­‐‑objects	   are	   codes	   and	   their	   necessary	  counterpart:	  code-­‐‑breaking	  software	  (Photo	  5).	  	  	  
Place	  photo	  5	  about	  here	  	  Special	  transmission	  equipment	  is	  used	  to	  encrypt	  messages	  and	  decipher	  them	  at	   the	   receiving	   end.	   One	   half	   of	   cryptology	   is	   about	   studying	   secret	   messages	   and	  breaking	  the	  system;	  the	  other	  half	  is	  about	  using	  methods	  or	  systems	  to	  change	  the	  text	  to	  hide	  its	  real	  meaning.	  The	  Cryptologic	  Museum	  contains	  an	  impressive	  collection	  of	  cypher	  discs	  (first	  invented	  in	  Italy	  in	  the	  15th	  century),	  cypher	  machines,	  alphabet	  strips,	  and	  encryptors.	  	  	  
Quasi-­‐‑objects:	  Codes,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  in	  secret	  organizations	  As	  for	  quasi-­‐‑objects	  (Latour	  [2005,	  p.	  238]	  also	  spoke	  of	  “quasi-­‐‑subjects,”	  which	  could	  be	  a	  good	  term	  for	  fake	  identities),	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  work	  of	  spies	  is	  made	  possible	  because	  they	  have	  fake	  identities.	  A	  cover	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  persona	  that	  guards	  and	  conceals	   the	   real	   identity	  of	   the	   spy.	   It	   is	   a	  quick	  disguise	   that	   sometimes	  consists	  merely	  of	  a	  false	  name.	  A	  legend	  is	  a	  carefully	  developed	  artificial	  life	  history	  and	  background	  description,	  both	  requiring	  painstaking	  attention	  to	  detail.	  A	  spy	  may	  live	  a	  false	  identity	  for	  years,	  actually	  establishing	  the	  legend	  in	  preparation	  for	  an	  operation.	  
Coding	   is	   a	   way	   of	   securing	   military,	   diplomatic,	   business-­‐‑related,	   and	   other	  sensitive	  types	  of	  communication	  from	  interception	  by	  competitors,	  the	  enemy,	  or	  even	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innocent	  bystanders	  (Czarniawska,	  2014).	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  Bletchley	  Park's	  operations	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  organization	  theory,	  Chris	  Grey	  (2012,	  269)	  suggested	  that	  even	  organization	   studies	   “encode”	  organizations	   “by	   the	  deployment	  of	   arcane	  vocabulary	  and	  also	  through	  the	  straitjacket	  of	  typologies,	  ideal	  types,	  concepts	  and	  constructs	  which	  do	   not	   necessarily	   assist	   the	   understanding	   of	   ‘how	   things	   work	   in	   organizations’.”	  Codebreaking	   did	   not	   end	   with	   World	   War	   II,	   but	   it	   is	   currently	   perceived	   quite	  differently.	  Codebreakers	  were	  “good	  guys”;	  hackers—the	  present-­‐‑day	  codebreakers—are	  now	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  “bad	  guys”	  (Halpern,	  2012).	  	   But	  there	  are	  also	  codes	  of	  conduct	  that	  describe—and	  regulate—the	  way	  people	  are	  to	  be	  treated	  and	  products	  are	  to	  be	  used.	  The	  rules	  and	  procedures	  used	  by	  spies	  are	  part	   of	   their	   tradecraft	   —“the	   tools	   and	   techniques	   that	   influence	   battles	   and	   sway	  governments”	  (International	  Spy	  Museum).	  	   From	  a	  whole	  array	  of	  rules	  and	  procedures,	  we	  have	  chosen	  to	  present	  the	  best	  known	  and	  most	  central	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  secret	  organizations,	  the	  most	  famous	  of	  which	  is	  the	  need-­‐‑to-­‐‑know	  rule.	  As	  Goffman	  (1969,	  p.	  78–79)	  noted,	  “[i]nformation	  is	  the	  hardest	  to	  guard,	  since	  it	  can	  be	  stolen	  without	  removing	  it.”	  This	  is	  why	  secret	  service	  organizations	   operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   reducing	   channels	   of	   communication.	   Goffman	  referred	  to	  this	  process	  as	  “compartmental	  insulation”	  (ibid).	  	  	   Secret	  service	  organizations	  often	  operate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  network	  in	  which	  the	  agents	   are	   nodes,	   and	   they	   connect	   with	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   other	   nodes	   without	  knowing	  the	  whole	  network.	  Agent	  runners	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  this	  organization,	  as	  they	  are	  often	  the	  only	  contact	  with	  the	  secret	  organization;	  all	  orders	  and	  instructions	  come	  from	  them.	  In	  contrast	  to	  ordinary	  organizations	  and	  other	  actor–networks,	  in	  which	  a	  spokesperson	  plays	  the	  central	  role	  (Latour,	  1988),	  those	  who	  speak	  publicly	  in	  secret	  organizations	   are	   detractors;	   the	   others	   whisper.	   Distrust	   underpinned	   by	   the	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requirement	  of	  absolute	  secrecy	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  notices	  in	  some	  of	  the	  1940s	  posters	  and	  manuals:	  “Rumors	  cost	  lives”;	  “A	  careless	  word…	  needless	  sinking”;	  “Loose	  lips	  might	  sink	   ships”;	   “Someone	   talked!”	   These	   were	   often	   accompanied	   by	   an	   image	   of	   the	  disastrous	  consequences	  of	  indiscretion—a	  sailor	  drowning	  in	  the	  ocean,	  with	  a	  sinking	  ship	  in	  the	  background.	  	   Goffman	  (1969)	  also	  noted	  that	   ignorance	  makes	  people	   incapable	  of	  betraying	  their	   own	   interests.	   This	   principle	   underpins	   one	   of	   the	  main	   rules	   of	   secret	   service	  operations.	  The	  consequences	  of	   revealing	   information	  are	  disastrous,	   so	   the	  need-­‐‑to-­‐‑know	  principle	  was	  necessary;	  some	  of	  the	  human	  sources	  whose	  identity	  the	  principle	  is	  meant	  to	  protect	  could	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  imprisonment	  or	  death	  should	  their	  activities	  be	  revealed.	  Even	  when	  spies	  obtain	  secret	  information	  from	  the	  enemy,	  they	  are	  often	  not	  allowed	  to	  reveal	  this	  fact	  to	  the	  enemy—what	  Goffman	  called	  a	  “counter-­‐‑uncovering”	  move.	  When	  the	  Bletchley	  Park	  scientists	  broke	  the	  Enigma	  code,	  they	  still	  could	  not	  avert	  all	  Nazi	  attacks,	  as	  this	  would	  alert	  the	  enemy	  that	  the	  code	  had	  been	  broken.	  Instead	  they	  selectively	  averted	  attacks,	  allowing	  the	  Nazis	  to	  carry	  out	  some	  of	  their	  attacks	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  Allies’	  cover	  (Grey,	  2012).	  Lives	  were	  sacrificed	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  enemy	  from	  discovering	  that	  the	  codes	  had	  been	  broken.	  
Recruitment	   procedures	   are	   another	   illustration	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   distrust.	  Recruitment	   of	   trustworthy	   spies	   is	   based	   on	   the	   candidates'	   capacity	   for	   ultimate	  distrust;	   it	   requires	   a	   thorough	   verification	   of	   the	   suitability	   of	   candidates	   and	   their	  ability	  to	  distrust	  others.	  Candidates	  are	  treated	  with	  suspicion	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  everything.	  Verifying	  the	  suitability	  of	  spies	  happens	  through	  the	  process	  of	  vetting.	  The	  secret	  service	  organization	  needs	  to	  have	  information	  about	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  potential	  recruit’s	  life,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  blackmail	  and	  bribing.	  Goffman	  noted	  that	   intelligence	   agents	   are	  often	   chosen	   from	  among	  people	  whose	  past	   and	  present	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offer	  the	  fewest	  bases	  for	  mobilizing	  divergent	  interests	  (1969,	  p.	  42).	  Vetting	  is	  crucial	  in	  espionage,	  and	  would-­‐‑be	  agents	  (and	  their	  family	  and	  close	  friends)	  who	  have	  not	  been	  properly	  assessed	  for	  their	  ability	  to	  keep	  secrets	  cannot	  be	  recruited.	  	   Along	  with	  coding	  and	  decoding	  devices,	  spies	  are	  said	  to	  use	  certain	  procedures	  
to	   exchange	   information.	   Visitors	   to	   the	   spy	  museums	  are	   reminded	   that	   espionage	   is	  primarily	   about	   stealing	   information	  without	  being	  noticed	   and	  passing	   it	   on	  without	  interception.	  Miniature	  texts	  can	  be	  placed	  on	  such	  unobtrusive	  objects	  as	  the	  underside	  of	   a	   postage	   stamp	   and	   deposited	   in	   dead	   drops	   (sometimes	   by	  means	   of	   dead-­‐‑drop	  spikes—	  best	  described	  as	  hollows	  nail	  that	  can	  hold	  pieces	  of	  paper	  and	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	   ground)	   in	   prearranged	   locations	   in	   isolated	   places.	   The	   receiver	   reads	   these	  messages	  by	  means	  of	  a	  microdot	  viewer.	  The	  spies	  then	  use	  predetermined	  signs	  to	  let	  others	  know	  about	  a	  new	  or	  completed	  operation;	  these	  signs	  are	  called	  signals	  and	  can	  be	  items	  or	  marks	  placed	  somewhere—a	  chalk	  mark	  on	  a	  postbox,	  for	  instance.	  	   Thus,	   the	   underpinning	   principle	   of	   spy	   operations	   is	   distrust.	   	   How	   about	  organizations	  that	  claim	  that	  the	  underpinning	  principle	  of	  their	  operation	  is	  trust?	  We	  now	  attempt	  to	  show	  a	  contrast	  to	  the	  usual	  assumption	  that	  distrust,	  if	  discovered,	  must	  be	   reduced	  or	   removed	   (see	  e.g.,	   Saunders	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Gago-­‐‑Rodrigues	  &	  Naranjo-­‐‑Gil	  2016),	  whereby	  trust	  can	  be	  intentionally	  produced	  and	  maintained.	  	  
Distrust	  in	  ordinary	  organizations	  Our	  investigation	  of	  the	  devices	  of	  distrust	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations	  inspired	  us	  to	  consider	  whether	  such	  devices	  exist	  in	  ordinary	  organizations.	  It	  can	  be	  claimed	  that	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  scientific	  management	  was	  also	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  introduction	  and	  gradual	  improvement	  of	  distrust	  devices	  in	  ordinary	  organizations.	  After	  all,	  time	  clocks	  forcing	  employees	  to	  clock	  in	  and	  out	  for	  their	  shifts	  could	  hardly	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  expression	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of	   trusting	   the	   workers	   (see	   e.g.,	   Luhmann,	   1979).	   Historically,	   Fox	   (1966)	   argued,	  distrust	  or	  “low	  trust”	  initiatives	  were	  related	  to	  “low-­‐‑discretion”	  jobs,	  characterized	  by	  greater	   direct	   and	   indirect	   control	   of	   the	   individual	   worker.	   A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	  contemporary	   organization,	   however,	   suggests	   that	   “high	   discretion”	   jobs—those	   of	  professionals,	   such	   as	   lawyers	   or	   doctors	   (Siebert	   et	   al.,	   2015),	   or	   employees	   in	  knowledge-­‐‑intensive	   industries—are	  characterized	  by	  equally	  high	   levels	  of	  control	  of	  employees.	  Even	  working	  from	  home,	  often	  presented	  as	  an	  example	  of	  empowerment	  providing	  employees	  with	  the	  discretion	  to	  decide	  their	  mode	  and	  time	  of	  working,	  can	  be	   closely	   monitored	   by	   electronic	   communication	   (Fairweather,	   1999;	   Taskin	   &	  Edwards,	   2007).	   Another	   good	   example	   is	   the	  GPS	  with	   a	   recorder,	   often	   installed	   in	  company	  cars	  to	  allow	  employers	  to	  know	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  an	  employee.	  	   More	   and	   more	   sophisticated	   technologies	   (i.e.,	   so-­‐‑called	   spyware)	   are	   being	  employed	  at	  the	  service	  of	  surveillance	  (Taylor	  &	  Bain,	  1999;	  Bain	  &	  Taylor,	  2000;	  Kinnie,	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Lankshear,	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Mulholland,	  2004;	  Ball,	  2010).	  There	  are	  recording	  and	  surveillance	   devices	   everywhere,	   and	   they	   serve	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   distrust	   of	   both	  outside	   agents	   (robbers,	   hackers)	   and	   disloyal	   employees.	   Indeed,	   surveillance	   is	  currently	   one	   of	   the	   hottest	   topics	   for	   debate	   both	   in	   the	   popular	   press	   and	   in	  management	  literature	  (see	  e.g.,	  Lyon,	  2007;	  Ball	  &	  Margulis,	  2011;	  Allmer,	  2012;	  Haque,	  2015).	  Manifestations	   of	   distrust	   through	   surveillance	   involve	  monitoring	   employees’	  telephone	   and	   e-­‐‑mail	   communications	   or	   protecting	   access-­‐‑to-­‐‑information	   systems	  through	  passwords.	  Another	  example	  is	  restricting	  physical	  access	  to	  certain	  parts	  of	  a	  building	   to	   those	   with	   magnetic	   card	   passes	   or	   master	   keys	   (Lashinsky,	   2012).	   This	  phenomenon	   could	   be	   (and	   is)	   interpreted	   as	   a	   breakdown	   of	   trust	   in	   society	   or,	  alternatively,	  as	  an	  institutionalization	  of	  organizational	  distrust.	  	   As	   with	   lie	   detectors,	   there	   are	   some	   non-­‐‑secret	   organizations	   that	   may	   use	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surveillance	  devices	  and	  resort	  to	  certain	  rules	  and	  procedures	  of	  distrust—undercover	  police,	  crime	  detectives,	  or	  special	  forces.	  Even	  without	  a	  specific	  device,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	   detect	   lies	   by	   using	   verbal	   tricks	   e.g.,	   setting	   a	   trap	   for	   interviewees	   in	   selection	  interviews.	  In	  fact,	  some	  management	  websites	  offer	  practical	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  detect	  lies	  in	  the	  responses	  of	  interviewees.1	  	  Moreover,	  the	  principle	  of	  distrust	  is	  often	  built	  into	   recruitment,	   selection,	   and	   induction	   procedures.	   Silverman	   and	   Jones	   (1976)	  showed	   convincingly	   how	   recruiters—intentionally	   or	   unconsciously—exclude	  candidates	  from	  specific	  social	  backgrounds.	  As	  they	  put	  it,	  	   	  ...	  “acceptable”	  people	  are	  people	  who	  play	  the	  game	  recognizably	  well	  and	  are	  rewarded	   for	   it.	   Yet	   this	   presumes	   a	   game-­‐‑known-­‐‑in-­‐‑common,	   with	   moves	  available	  to	  be	  performed	  and	  observed	  by	  players.	  So,	  as	  well	  as	  playing	  the	  game	  at	  a	  high	  standard,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  playing	  the	  game	  at	  all.	  (1976,	  p.	  117)	  	  	  Clearly,	  “playing	  the	  game	  well”	  and	  using	  Goffman’s	  counter-­‐‑uncovering	  moves	  is	  not	  limited	   to	   secret	   organizations.	  Many	   recruitment	   interviews,	   and	   even	   performance-­‐‑appraisal	  meetings,	  can	  often	  take	  a	  form	  that	  closely	  resembles	  interrogation.	  	   Fabricated	   identities	   are	   the	   normal	   content	   of	   websites,	   including	   legends	  concerning	   founders	   or	   leaders	   of	   organizations.	   Like	   spy	   legends,	   they	   can	   be	  undermined.	   Also,	   selection	   and	   recruitment	   panels	   are	   on	   the	   lookout	   for	   fabricated	  identities	   and	   legends	   of	   applicants	   for	   jobs.	   Just	   like	   spy	   legends,	   these	   can	   be	  undermined	   by	   checking	   letters	   of	   reference	   against	   several	   sources—yet	   another	  procedure	  of	  distrust	  evident	  in	  contemporary	  organizations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-­‐‑tell-­‐‑candidate-­‐‑lying-­‐‑interview-­‐‑ji-­‐‑a-­‐‑min-­‐‑masc,	  accessed	  2016-­‐‑10-­‐‑26.	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   Secrecy,	  distrust,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  various	  devices	  to	  protect	  information	  are	  clearly	  visible	  in	  the	  launching	  of	  new	  products	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  strategies.	  These	  are	  also	   inherent	   in	   contract	   negotiations	   in	   commercially	   sensitive	   inter-­‐‑organizational	  deals.	  The	  need-­‐‑to-­‐‑know	  rule	  is	  familiar	  to	  all	  organizations.	  Economic	  espionage	  and	  the	  protection	   of	   trade	   secrets	   are	  well-­‐‑known	   activities,	   supported	   by	   a	   solid	   legal	   base	  (Snider	  &	   Ellins,	   2006).	   Pendergrast’s	   (2000)	   famous	   book	   explaining	   how	   Coca-­‐‑Cola	  preserved	   its	   secrets	   can	   compete	   with	   many	   secret	   service	   stories.	   In	   Inside	   Apple,	  Lashinsky	   (2012)	   revealed	   that	   employees	   were	   kept	   in	   the	   dark	   about	   new	   Apple	  products,	  just	  as	  the	  public	  was.	  Apparently,	  they	  were	  allowed	  to	  enter	  only	  certain	  parts	  of	   Apple's	   campus	   that	   directly	   related	   to	   their	   work.	   What	   is	   more,	   according	   to	  Lashinsky,	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  employees	  to	  have	  access	  to	  a	  room	  that	  their	  boss	  could	  not	  enter,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  common	  to	  question	  this	  procedure.	  “What	  you're	  not	  told,	  you	  don't	  ask	  about,”	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  leading	  maxim	  in	  Steve	  Job's	  	  “embrace	  secrecy”	  formulation.	   Apple	   was,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   one	   employee,	   “the	   ultimate	   need-­‐‑to-­‐‑know	  culture”	  (Lashinsky,	  2012,	  p.	  41).	  	   Ordinary	   organizations	   do	   not	   use	   suicide	   pills	   (as	   far	   as	   we	   know!),	   yet	   an	  involuntary	  resignation	  from	  a	  senior	  post	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  suicide	  pill.	  And	  so	  are	  symbolic	  executions	  which	  resonate	  with	  spy	  executions:	  …	  the	  security	  briefing,	   the	  one	  element	  that	  no	  Apple	  employee	   forgets.	  Call	   it	  Scared	  Silent.	  Borchers,	  the	  iPhone	  marketing	  executive	  who	  had	  worked	  at	  Nike	  and	  Nokia	  before	  joining	  Apple,	  recalled	  the	  scene.	  “Whoever	  headed	  up	  security	  came	   in	   and	   said,	   ‘Okay,	   everybody	   understands	   secrecy	   and	   security	   are	  incredibly	  important	  here.	  Let	  me	  just	  explain	  why.’	  And	  the	  rationale	  is	  that	  when	  Apple	  launches	  a	  product,	  if	  it’s	  been	  a	  secret	  up	  until	  the	  launch,	  the	  amount	  of	  press	  and	  coverage	  and	  buzz	  that	  you	  get	  is	  hugely	  valuable	  to	  the	  company.	  ‘It’s	  worth	  millions	  of	  dollars’,	   I	   remember	  her	  saying.”	  So	   there’s	  no	  confusion,	   the	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penalty	  for	  revealing	  Apple	  secrets,	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally,	  is	  clear:	  swift	  termination.	  (Lashinsky,	  2012,	  36)	  	   Apple	   is	   not	   unique:	   as	   Anteby	   (2014)	   reported,	   the	   metaphor	   of	   "Russian	  roulette"	  has	  been	  used	  often	  when	  speaking	  of	  non-­‐‑tenure	  decisions.	  But	  we	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  extend	  the	  analogy	  too	  far.	  Table	  1	  contains	  some	  comparisons,	  although	  a	  match-­‐‑for-­‐‑match	  comparison	  of	  devices	  of	  distrust	  in	  secret	  services	  and	  ordinary	  organizations	  is	  not	  always	  possible.	  	  Secret	  service	  organizations	  are,	  of	  course,	  a	  special	  case,	  an	  extreme	  case	  of	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  distrust.	  Yet	  our	  analysis	  of	  devices,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	   of	   distrust	   in	   secret	   service	   organizations	   allowed	   us	   to	   draw	   some	  conclusions	   about	   trust	   and	  distrust	   in	  ordinary	  organizations.	   Some	  of	   these	  devices	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  literature	  on	  control	  and	  surveillance	  in	  organizations,	  but	  they	  are	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  trust	  and	  distrust.	  
	  
Table	  1	  here	  
	  
Distrust	  in	  secret	  and	  ordinary	  organizations	  Through	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  devices	  of	  distrust	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  we	  have	  made	   two	   contributions	   to	   organizational	   theory:	   first	   is	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  distrust	  is	  integral	  to	  many	  intra-­‐‑	  and	  inter-­‐‑organizational	  relationships,	  and	  second	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  use	  of	  Actor-­‐‑Network	  Theory	  in	  analyzing	  distrust.	  We	  discuss	  these	  two	  contributions	  in	  turn	  now.	  The	   literature	   on	   secret	   service	   organizations,	   both	   academic	   and	   popular,	  suggests	   that	   spies	   at	   the	   same	   time	   appear	   to	   trust	   and	   distrust	   each	   other,	   their	  organizations,	  and	  others,	  and	  both	  trust	  and	  distrust	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	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the	  secret	  service	  organizations.	  But,	  as	  secret	  service	  organizations	  are	  an	  extreme	  case	  of	   distrustful	   organizations,	   in	   this	   paper	   we	   have	   specifically	   focused	   on	   distrust.	  Inspired	  by	  ANT,	  we	  analyzed	  the	  devices,	  codes,	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  used	  in	  secret	  service	  organizations,	  and	  we	  asked	  another	  question:	  Do	  these	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	  differ	  from	  those	  used	  in	  ordinary	  organizations?	  	  	   It	   seems	   that	   the	   functioning	   of	   secret	   service	   organizations	   may	   prove	   more	  relevant	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   ordinary	   organizations	   than	   is	   usually	   assumed	   (see	  Costas	  &	  Grey,	  2016,	  and	  Parker,	  2016,	  on	  analysis	  of	  secret	  organizations).	  	  One	  obvious	  explanation	  for	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  organizations	  is	  the	  technology	  transfer.	  Most	  organizational	  technologies	  came	  to	  civil	  organizations	  from	  the	  military,	  and	   the	   secret	   service	   organizations	   searched	   for	   and	   applied	   the	  most	   advanced	   (or	  better	  said,	  extreme)	  examples	  of	  these	  military	  technologies.	  For	  the	  latter,	  those	  that	  worked	  were	  then	  transferred	  to	  ordinary	  organizations	  in	  a	  milder	  form.	  	   This	   relevance	   becomes	   obvious	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   literature	   on	  organizational	  trust	  suggests	  that	  trust	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  organizations.	   Creating,	   maintaining	   and	   repairing	   trust	   seems	   to	   be	   only	   option	   to	  pursue	  by	  contemporary	  organizations	  (Börjeson,	  2017;	  Fulmer	  &	  Gelfand,	  2012;	  Reich-­‐‑Graefe,	  2014).	  This	  approach	  to	  trust-­‐‑as-­‐‑choice	  was	  critiqued	  by	  Zygmunt	  Bauman	  (2010,	  30)	  who	  wrote:	  “That	  it	  is	  by	  trust	  that	  the	  economic,	  political	  and	  social	  orders	  stand,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  by	  its	  absence	  that	  they	  fail	  has	  now	  become	  the	  doxa	  of	  political	  science.”	  Organizational	  trust	  has	  evolved	  into	  an	  industry;	  armies	  of	  academics	  and	  consultants	  advise	  organizations	  on	  the	  building	  and	  maintaining	  of	  trust,	  and	  how	  to	  repair	  it	  when	  it	  is	  broken.	  Trust	   is	  a	  word	  that	  looms	  large	  in	  management	  and	  organization	  studies,	  and	   has,	   over	   the	   years,	   overshadowed	   such	   terms	   as	   loyalty,	   engagement,	   and	  commitment.	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Yet,	  the	  quote	  from	  Niklas	  Luhmann	  which	  we	  included	  in	  our	  introduction,	  points	  out	  the	  complex	  connection	  between	  trust	  and	  distrust	  in	  complex	  systems.	  This	  point	  made	  by	  Luhmann	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  ignored	  by	  contemporary	  trust	  researchers.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  have	  demonstrated,	  organizations	  built	  primarily	  on	  distrust	  do	  exist,	  and	  quite	  a	  few	  elements	  of	  distrust	  are	  built	  into	  ordinary	  organizations	  as	  well.	  	  A	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  other	  or	  a	  concern	  that	  he	  or	  she	  may	  want	  to	  harm	  us,	  referred	  to	  by	  Govier	  in	  his	  definition	  of	  distrust,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  most	  organizations—secret	  or	  not.	  Many	  researchers	  have	  studied	  trust	  (e.g.,	  Sitkin	  &	  Stickel,	  1996;	  Grey	  &	  Garsten,	  2001;	  Appelbaum,	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Godard,	  2004;	  and	  Elsbach	  et	  al.,	  2012);	  but	  distrust	   is	  often	  be	  described	  as	  accidental,	   in	  many	  cases	  as	  unintended	  and,	   in	   the	  worst	   case,	  proof	  of	  faulty	  management.	  In	  contrast,	  our	  study	  redirects	  attention	  to	  distrust	  that	  is	  intentionally	  built	  and	  maintained,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  Apple	  example.	  It	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  some	  organizations,	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  their	  success:	  as	  Luhmann	  rightly	  pointed	  out,	  it	  is	  institutionalized.	  Secret	  service	  organizations	  would	  endanger	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  people	  if	  they	  ceased	  to	  distrust	  potential	  recruits,	  their	  employees,	  and	  strangers	  from	  outside	  their	  own	  circles.	  But	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  operations	  of	  some	  knowledge-­‐‑intensive	  and	  patent-­‐‑based	  organizations	  would	   risk	   their	   competitive	  advantage	   if	   they	  were	  more	  trusting	  and	  open	  about	  their	  commercial	  secrets.	   It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  this	  mixture	  of	  trust	  and	  distrust	  has	  become	  much	  more	  visible	  at	  present	   in	  “the	  new	  technological	  age”	  of	  information	  (Merges	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  but	  historical	  material	  could	  also	  be	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  contemporary	  phenomena.	  	  	   	  Actor-­‐‑Network	  Theory	  has	  never	  been	  used	  in	  the	  study	  of	  distrust,	  where	  the	  role	  of	  artifacts	  did	  not	  seem	  obvious,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  excellent	  frame	  for	  analyzing	  distrust,	  in	  whose	  construction	  artifacts	  pay	  a	  crucial	  role.	  Previous	  studies	  treated	  distrust	  as	  "a	  state	  with	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  dimensions"	  (Saunders,	  et	  al,	  2014,	  Bijlsma-­‐‑Frankema,	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et	   al.	   2015),	   but	   entirely	   ignored	   the	   material	   manifestations	   of	   distrust.	   Our	   study	  demonstrates	  the	  power	  of	  these	  material	  manifestations.	  The	  presence	  of	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	   reminds	   organizational	   actors	   that	   they	   are	   being	  watched,	   listened	   to,	  recorded,	   and	  manipulated;	   in	   other	  words,	   that	   they	   are	   distrusted.	   The	  presence	   of	  these	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects	  also	  allows	  organizational	  actors	  to	  watch,	  listen,	  record,	  and	  manipulate	  others.	   In	   future	  studies	  of	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  distrust	   in	  organizations,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  focus	  on	  technologies,	  physical	  objects,	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects,	  as	  these	  reflect	  individuals’	  conscious	  choices	  to	  distrust,	  and	  to	  organize	  action	  around	  distrust.	  These	  objects	  and	  quasi-­‐‑objects,	  together	  with	  discourses,	  guarantee	  stability	  of	  the	  connections	  among	  organizational	  actions.	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Examples	  from	  secret	  
organizations	  
Examples	  from	  ordinary	  
organizations	  
Concealment	  	  	   Fountain	  pen	  with	  a	  concealed	  microdot	  viewer	  Concealment	  cufflinks	  for	  storing	  microdots	  Drop-­‐‑dead	  spikes,	  which	  could	  be	  put	  in	  the	  ground	  in	  prearranged	  places	  to	  insert	  hidden	  messages	  Hollow	  bolt	  used	  for	  hiding	  information	  Clams	  with	  magnets	  could	  be	  filled	  with	  money	  or	  cameras	  and	  attached	  under	  metal	  girders	  of	  bridges,	  etc.	  Microdot	  viewers	  Miniature	  tape	  recorders	  
Safes	  Password	  protected	  systems	  Locked	  rooms	  
Recording	  	  	   Moskova	  recorder	  –	  could	  be	  hidden	  on	  the	  body	  and	  activated	  by	  the	  pocket	  controller	  Minifon	  attaché	  kit	  –	  a	  recording	  device	  concealed	  in	  a	  watch	  Wire	  recorders	  
Recorders	  of	  telephone	  calls	  (e.g.	  in	  call	  centres)	  Time	  clocks	  Smart	  phones	  used	  as	  recorders	  
Surveillance	  	   Cameras	  hidden	  in	  spectacles,	  watches,	  briefcases,	  bras,	  and	  umbrellas	  	  
Security	  cameras	  GPS-­‐‑systems	  "Spyware"	  
Escape	  	  	  	  
Escape	  map	  that	  doesn’t	  rustle	  when	  opened	  Cufflink	  compass	  Pencil-­‐‑clip	  compass	  Gas-­‐‑tank	  pill	  which	  expands	  and	  blocks	  the	  fuel	  pipe	  
Escape	  doors	  (e.g.	  in	  doctors'	  surgeries)	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Ninisid	  –	  an	  instrument	  that	  can	  detect	  vibration	  from	  a	  vehicle	  or	  an	  intruder’s	  footsteps	  and	  send	  an	  alarm	  in	  the	  earpiece	  Break-­‐‑in	  	   Lock	  picks	  Wrenches	  Burglar-­‐‑alarm	  evasion	  kit	  
Master	  keys	  allowing	  entry	  into	  all	  offices	  Password	  bypass	  allowing	  managers	  access	  to	  employees’	  emails	  Disguise	  	   A	  heel-­‐‑insert	  to	  change	  a	  person’s	  walk	  A	  travel	  disguise	  kit	  containing	  comb,	  scissors,	  cold	  cream,	  tweezers,	  etc.	  False	  moustaches,	  wigs,	  headscarves	  
Dress	  codes	  in	  business	  organizations	  Uniforms	  
Hiding	  	   Thermal	  blanket	  to	  mask	  body	  heat	  Concealed	  compartments	  in	  cars	  and	  rooms	  Shredders	  
Shredders	  
Encoding/	  decoding	  	   Cipher	  wheels	  Cipher	  discs	  Mixed	  alphabet	  strips	  Voice	  encryptors	  Enigma	  ciphers	  
Encrypted	  emails	  
Transport	  	   Homing	  pigeons	  used	  to	  transport	  documents	  through	  the	  enemy	  lines	   Special	  transport	  companies	  Manipulation	  	   Poisons	  and	  drugs	  used	  to	  manipulate	  and	  control	  the	  minds	  of	  people	   Interview	  "traps"	  Suicide	  	   Cyanide	  tablet	  hidden	  in	  a	  molar	   -­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑	  Killing	  	   Pistol	  designed	  to	  fire	  at	  close	  range	  and	  to	  be	  concealed	  in	  a	  lipstick	  case,	  cigarette	  lighter,	  tobacco	  pipe	  Umbrella	  with	  poisonous	  gas	  hidden	  in	  it	  Booby-­‐‑trap	  explosive	  devices	  Fire	  starters	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑	  
	  
